This article looks at the distribution of two EC merger procedural events and examines the effect of the indefinite-length suspension of merger investigations. Although the ECMR refers to the suspension of investigations as an exceptional instrument, it is used in a high proportion of cases. As the ECMR does not set a time limit for suspension, it can lead to significant delay in the assessment of mergers. To understand the causes of delay, this article relies on the fact that the suspension of the investigation is a consequence of merging parties' failure to provide the necessary information to the Commission. Two main causes of this behaviour are identified. Firstly, merging parties may decide to intentionally withhold information in order to cause the suspension of the investigation, which allows them more time to do whatever is necessary to avoid a lengthy second phase investigation. Secondly, failure to provide the required information to the Commission may be a result of merging parties' negligence towards the regulatory assessment of their merger. Whereas the first case may be socially beneficial, identifying the second type of behaviour may help in filtering out inefficient mergers.
Introduction
The length of merger review has been in the centre of criticism in Europe. The main reason for this is that very long merger approval procedures often lead to forgone mergers as a result of the delayed approval. The judicial review of European Commission merger decisions has been particularly referred to as making the approval practically meaningless from a commercial point of view. 1 Delayed approval of mergers however is not always caused by judicial review.
The purpose of this paper is to show the diversity in the delay-averseness of merging parties, which largely affects the litigation strategy they will choose. The analysis will be based on the uncertainty that the possibility of the indefinite-length suspension of proceedings introduces into the timeframe of merger investigations. As suspension is typically a result of merging parties' negligence and failure to provide sufficient and adequate information to the Commission, higher degree of uncertainty would mean a more diverse group of companies in terms of their delay-averseness.
I will show that given the current EC merger regulatory framework, there are two main sources of reasons why investigations are suspended. Firstly, merging parties may act 'intentionally' in a way to cause suspension, thereby winning some time to make the necessary steps in order to avoid an in-depth investigation. Secondly, it may also be the negligent behaviour parties and their lack of delay averseness that lead to the 'unintentional' suspension of the investigation. Although the analysed sample is a pool of European Commission cases, due to the similarity of merger procedures across Europe the main results could potentially be valid for other jurisdictions as well. Ekelund and Thornton (1999) warns about the social costs of a delayed merger procedure for restructuring industries claiming that the length of a merger review should be reduced to 30 days. They distinguish between direct and indirect costs of regulatory approval, the former in the form of compliance costs, lobbying, public relations, etc. being expenditures that are a pure deadweight loss to society, and the latter in the form of lost products, 1 See for example Heim (2003) innovations, and (potentially forgone) efficiencies signifying the more relevant social costs.
In a more boiled down version of the above paper Ekelund, Ford and Thornton (2001) demonstrated empirically that mergers in regulated industries take longer to complete than mergers in other industries. The authors assumed that the length is influenced by the degree of industry concentration, the size of the merging companies, and on whether the merger is subject to multiple regulatory approvals (which is very typically the case in regulated industries). Their results showed that all these three factors increase the length of the completion of the merger. The two papers cited above focus on the delay caused by the regulator. To carry on with the same thought but from a different perspective, I will place more emphasis on the delay caused by the merging parties, which can also result in mergers falling through, especially in cases where the suspension was the result of merging parties' negligence attitude towards the merger investigation.
The paper is structured as follows: firstly an introduction of the timeframe of EC merger procedures is given. This is followed by a short comparative outlook of European Member State provisions regarding the suspension of merger investigations. Secondly the empirical results are presented through an analysis of the distribution of two procedural events, the offer of merger remedies and the Commission's final decision. Finally a simulated case, where indefinite suspension is not allowed, is analysed. 2 However, the authors assumed normality for the length variable, something that might not be the case in every jurisdiction -as is later shown by this paper a Member State competition authority; 10 (3) a no jurisdiction decision if the merger does not fall in the scope of the ECMR; 11 (4) unconditional approval of the merger; 12 (5) conditional approval of the merger; 13 (6) referral of the case to a Member State; 14 or (7) initiate a second phase investigation.
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The first six types of decisions have one thing in common: they all lead to the end of the Commission's involvement in the procedure. As far as (7) is concerned, it leads to the start of a more thorough investigation (phase II investigation), where the Commission has a longer period of time to examine the merger at case together with the remedies offered in order to decide on the merits of the merger. In this investigational phase, which starts on the day of decision (5), the Commission has 90 working days 16 to reach a decision (if remedies are offered before day 55 of the second phase investigation). The time limit for final decision is extended to 105 working days if remedies are offered after day 55. 17 This period can be extended by a further 20 days at the request of the merging parties or as an initiative from the Commission subject to the approval of the merging parties. 18 The Commission can also clear a merger earlier than the 90 (105) The notifying parties have a one-off opportunity to request an extension of no more than 20 working days of Phase two, provided this request is made not later than 15 working days after the decision to initiate an in-depth inquiry. 25 Provided that they do so, it will result in a 10-day extension of the time limit for the Commission's decision, as explained above. If the merging parties miss this deadline, and the merger would result in anticompetitive effects, the parties will have to face a second phase investigation. This is a rather strong incentive for companies to be ready to offer remedies at the outset.
Once the second phase starts, there is a deadline of 65 days for submitting commitments. This deadline may be extended, if the length of the phase II investigation is also extended according to Article 10 (3) of the ECMR.
Remedies can also be offered following the 65 day deadline, but only where based on the already available information the Commission can clearly determine that these commitments resolve the identified competition concerns and where there is sufficient time to allow for an adequate assessment by the Commission.
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The above paragraphs set out a rigorous timeframe for EC merger procedures. Although the regulatory approval process is often regarded as a delay that merging parties inevitably encounter in their integration process, 
The timing of remedy offers
The NREM variable is also treated as a continuous one. It measures the number of working days between the notification of the merger and the day of the remedy offer. In EC merger procedures, in case of anticompetitive mergers, it is the merging parties who have to make the remedy offer and the Commission decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is not accepted, the parties can make subsequent offers until the Commission accepts them (if the offer eliminates the competitive concern) or until the procedure finishes (the merger is prohibited if parties fail to offer a suitable remedy by this time.
Similarly to the length variable, in order to make the two subsamples of the old and the new ECMR comparable, the difference between the deadlines had to be accounted for. The same weighting was used as explained above.
Information on the timing of remedy offers was published in the Commission's case report, but it is not reported in every decision, which resulted in missing observations for 27 merger cases. The available data revealed no evidence for the missing observations not missing at random. Given that in the individual cases there can be more than one remedy offer (if the previous offers had been rejected) there are altogether 302 remedy offers in the sample. In Table 2 NREMg is the sample without outliers, and NREMs is the sample not including the suspension of the investigation. REM1 refers to the number of working days between notification and the first remedy offer. The same can be said of the timing of remedy offers as of the length of the investigations.
High variance suggests that there are some characteristics of a merger that makes parties offer remedies at significantly different times.
Suspension of investigations and other sources of delay
In the analysed sample there were 39 cases (20 phase I and 19 phase II)
where the Commission suspended the procedure and this suspension is explicitly mentioned in the case report. Table 3 summarises the number of suspension and no suspension cases in phase I and phase II procedures, broken down into cases under the old and the new ECMR. Although the ECMR reserves the suspension of investigation to exceptional situations, there was a suspension in around 20% of the cases and this figure seems to be constant under the old and the new ECMR. 41 The total number of suspension cases for phase I and phase II procedures (found in the 'Total sample' rows of Table 3 ) are very similar, 42 but we can also see that they represent a higher proportion in phase II cases. 43 Under the old ECMR the proportion of cases with suspension was roughly the same in phase I and phase II cases, whereas under the new ECMR suspension is clearly more likely in phase II cases (11% of phase I and 47% of phase II suspended).
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However, the relative length of these suspensions is higher in phase I cases.
In the sample, there were 39 cases with suspension explicitly mentioned in the Commission's report. For the remainder of the cases it was assumed that the investigation was not suspended.
41
This is a strikingly high figure considering the fact that Article 10(4) of the ECMR says that "The periods set by paragraphs 1 and 3 shall exceptionally be suspended where, owing to circumstances for which one of the undertakings involved in the concentration is responsible"
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However, it will be showed later that the relative length of suspension is higher in phase I cases 43 In testing the difference, the t-score of the Student's t-test was -2.3508
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In testing the difference, the t-score of the Student's t-test was -3.7428 Table 4 summarises the length of suspension in EC merger investigations.
The continuous variable SUSP was broken down into phase I and phase II for those cases only, where the investigation was suspended by the Commission.
The table shows that the investigation was suspended in around 20% of the total number of analysed cases, even though the ECMR refers to suspensions as an exceptional possibility. 45 Although phase II suspensions are more frequent (Table 3) , Table 4 reveals that phase I suspensions last longer. This is not surprising as the suspension of the investigation is due to circumstances for which the merging parties are responsible, therefore they can deliberately 'cause the suspension of a case' in order to gain more time for making sure they can avoid a phase II investigation.
Apart from the cases where suspension was explicitly mentioned in the merger decision, there were another 73 cases, where the length of the procedure exceeded the regulatory limit but typically only by a few days. 46 No explanation was found to this in the analysed texts and therefore further will be referred to as unaccounted delay. In 16 of these cases the case was referred to the Commission from a Member State authority, which could also have caused some unaccounted delay The length of unaccounted delay is typically around 2 or 3 days. As the % rows reveal, unaccounted delay was significantly more likely under the old-ECMR, 47 which might suggest a reporting bias as older case reports are typically shorter and therefore are more likely to avoid reporting the cause of a delay (especially if it is a rather short one). As the source of unaccounted delay is not revealed in the texts of EC merger decisions, the focus of this paper remains on suspension cases that were published in the sample decisions.
Effect of indefinite suspension in European Commission merger intervention cases (1999-2008)
This section looks at the effect of indefinite-length suspension in European Commission merger decisions. For this reason, the distribution (over time) of the timing of two procedural events (submission of remedy proposals, and final decision) will be analysed. I will show that even the length of procedural events should be regarded as a set of stochastic variables in both situations.
As the uncertainty is largely a result of the possibility of indefinite suspension -which is a consequence of merging parties' negligence in providing the necessary information to the Commission -the non-parametric estimations below support the hypothesis that not all mergers are equally delay-averse. It
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In testing the difference, the t-score of the Student's t-test was 4.4106 will also be shown that the uncertainty about the length of the analysed eventspell is higher in phase I cases suggesting that the possibility of suspension may be used in cases to gain some time and avoid phase II procedures.
A non-parametric analysis of cases with indefinite length suspension
When trying to fit a distribution one often relies on non-parametric means to be able to draw some inference on the shape of the density function (whether it is monotonic increasing or decreasing, convex or concave, etc). The use of 
NLENGTH
To show that the bimodality is given by the two-staged nature of EC merger procedures, the samples are separated into phase I and phase II investigations. Firstly, Figure 2 shows 50 the distribution of the timing of remedy offers 51 for Phase I and Phase II procedures.
The two kernel curves in Figure 2 both suggest that the separation of the sample into phase I and phase II investigations resulted in two unimodally distributed sub-samples. What is also apparent from Figure 2 is that the tails of the two distributions -especially for phase I cases -are rather heavy (i.e.
there is a relatively high likelihood of extreme values), and right-skewed, especially in the case of the phase I sub-sample. The presented histograms suggest that despite the strict procedural timeframe the distribution of the analysed four variables may be better explained by some kind of unbounded distribution function. Therefore, when making an assumption about the functional form of the distributions we would be looking at a distribution which is bounded from left (signifying the start of the procedure) but is unbounded to the right, 53 and is able to accommodate rather heavy right tails. However, before making such assumptions, the boundedness of the distribution of all four variables is going to be tested, and then a parametric form is chosen to describe the distribution of the analysed EC procedural event variables. The two sub-samples of phase I and phase II investigations are analysed separately. 54 Once their functional form is found, this information can be plugged into the bimodal curve of the total sample.
Analysing boundedness
The method for testing the boundedness of the distributions of the analysed sample of variables is taken from Slifker and Shapiro ( This does not mean that any of the event spell variables may assume a value of infinity, only that unbounded theoretical distributions might be better suited at explaining the behaviour of these variables 54
In Phase I cases the competition problem must be identifiable at the beginning of the procedure, and a remedy must be offered in a time that still allows sufficient time for the Commission to assess whether that remedy is sufficient enough. What is more interesting for this analysis are the Phase II procedures. These procedures start off in frame of a Phase I investigation and then carry on to Phase II when the parties fail to provide sufficient commitments in due time The Johnson system of distributions was proposed in Johnson (1949) to ensure the best approximation of any analysed theoretical distribution (see also and George (2007)). These distributions are approximated by using a system of three corresponding functions, which allows a transformation of the analysed random variables into a standard normal distributed random variable, and thus highly facilitate analytical work. In order to decide which function to use for the Johnson transformation, Johnson proposed plotting the standardised third and fourth moments of the examined variable ( 1 β , and 2 β ) on a two dimensional plane, which maps all three functions in a manner where the plane is divided by the SL distributions (lognormal) into the region of SB functions (bounded) and the region of SU functions (unbounded). Many different ways have been proposed to find out which of the above three Johnson categories an empirical distribution falls into, this paper uses one of these methods. (For a summary of these methods see for example DeBrota, Roberts, Swain, Dittus, Wilson and Sekhar (1988)) 56 The proof can be found in Slifker and Shapiro (1980) From the values calculated for m, n, and p we can use these criteria to select the corresponding member of the Johnson family (or at least to decide whether the analysed samples are bounded or not). 57 However at this stage I was only interested in whether the analysed distributions are bounded from right as we know that from left they are necessarily bounded at zero (i.e. as there is no negative length of procedural time-spells).
For this reason the method from Slifker and Shapiro (1980) is used with a slight tweak by ignoring the left tail Table 6 reveals that apart from phase II remedy offers where 5 . = z , the calculated 2 p m is rather large for all the examined cases, showing that the distance between the outer points is clearly larger than the distance between the two inner points. This implies that for cases where indefinite suspension of the investigation is allowed, the analysed four variables follow a distribution, which is best explained by a process that is unbounded to the right. These results do not tell us how well the analysed four samples fit any of the theoretical distributions, although one should assume that given the versatility of the Johnson S U distribution, it could be used to mathematically describe the distribution of these variables. Nevertheless, for simplicity (both the Johnson S U and the Johnson S B have 4 parameters to estimate and work with).and for theoretical justification (i.e. that these variables should be non-negative) a different assumption will be made, as is presented below.
Finding a functional form for the analysed event-spell variables
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To formally analyse the distribution of the two examined procedural events, a few assumptions have to be made. We will assume that timing of final decisions and remedy offers are distributed according to a continuous 60 At first, results are presented and explained. The economic and legal interpretation of these results can be found in the subsequent section process, which is subdivided into ( ) From the analysis of histograms I assume that neither the timing of remedy offers nor the timing of final decisions is uniformly distributed; i.e. the probability of t assuming any value is not uniform. Much rather an inverted U- contains remedies that were offered after the phase II procedure had started 63 Assuming that pre-notification discussion (according to paragraph 78 of the 'new remedies Notice') between the parties and the Commission about potential remedies do not count as remedy offers weibull distribution. What is common in these distributions is that they are all unimodal, non-negative, unbounded and can accommodate a right-skewed shape. Another appealing feature of all four of these distributions is that they are often used for modelling duration data, similar to that being analysed here.
The summary descriptive statistics of the four chosen theoretical variables, in comparison to the empirical summary statistics are contained in Table 7 . The theoretical distributions were fitted to the data by moment estimation. As far as the timing of the final decision is concerned (NLENGTH section of Table   7 ), the log-logistic distribution seemed to have performed better than the other three distributions. The lognormal, the gamma, and the weibull distributions all underestimated the level of skewness and kurtosis, whereas the log-logistic distribution overestimated the kurtosis and somewhat underestimated the skewness of the distribution (but was still the closest hit regarding the skewness of the sample). The log-logistic kurtosis for phase I procedures is very large, therefore the theoretical distribution that is most capable of accommodating such a high level of kurtosis (i.e. the log-logistic distribution) should be preferred. The picture is a little more ambiguous for the timing of remedy offers (the NREM rows of Table 7 ), although the weibull distribution clearly underperforms the others. The gamma and the lognormal distributions underestimate the skewness and the kurtosis of the distribution but this is not as significant as above. The log-logistic assumption gives a small overestimation of skewness, but the kurtosis of phase I cases is very significantly overestimated. The ambiguity of the results displayed in Table 7 suggests that a goodness of fit test is needed to confirm the choice of assumed theoretical distribution.
It stands out that the phase I empirical measures of skeweness and kurtosis are greater than the same measures for the phase II subsample. Using measures of the skeweness and kurtosis standard errors from Tabachnick and Fidell (2006), we can calculate the confidence intervals for all subsamples to show that they are different. The table shows that both the skeweness and the kurtosis of the two variables are significantly larger in phase I, implying a distribution with a more pointed section in the middle, and heavier tails on either one or on both sides.
The four analysed sub-samples were tested against the four examined theoretical distributions using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS), an AndersonDarling (AD) and a chi-square goodness of fit test. 64 The results are contained in Table 9 . Bold numbers indicate those cases where we cannot reject at the 64 See Appendix 2.4 for description of these tests given confidence level that the sample was drawn from the given theoretical distribution. a The Chi-square critical value depends on the degree of freedom for each distribution, whereas the AD test makes use of the specific distribution in calculating critical values, therefore the critical values had to be calculated for each distribution. b
The 3-parameter version of the distribution was used to allow for a horizontal shifting of the curve.
In phase I, all of the tested distributions were rejected as a result of the goodness of fit tests. The reason for this might be that the sample size is larger (n = 136, 188) and as a result the KS critical values are smaller.
Another explanation can be derived from knowing that phase I skeweness and kurtosis are higher than the phase II measures. This means a higher probability of extreme values in the phase I subsample that is difficult to capture with the tested theoretical distributions, which explains the relatively bad fitting.
As the three goodness-of-fit tests order the examined distributions differently, are the shape parameters. The density function for all four sub-samples is given by:
One of the advantages of choosing the log-logistic distribution is that its parameters are easily interpretable. From (3) we can see how a change in the two parameters, α and β can change the density curve. A change in α shifts the curve right or left on the horizontal axis, whereas a decrease in β reduces the dispersion of the curve. 
The legal and economic explanation of the findings
The above findings have interesting legal and economic explanations. First of all, I showed that the skeweness and kurtosis are significantly higher in the phase I sub-samples. Knowing the EC regulatory background, this means that even though suspension is more frequent in phase II investigations, it has a stronger effect on phase I cases, implying that the relative effect of suspension is larger in phase I cases. 66 One of the explanations is that merging parties, who want to avoid phase II investigations, might 'deliberately'
withhold some information to cause the suspension of the investigation in the phase I stage of the investigation in order to gain more time, for example to 65 As β tends to infinity, the excess kurtosis of the distribution tends to 6/5
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Although it was also showed that the absolute length of suspension is also larger in phase I finalise or improve their remedy offers. Box 2 provides an example to these cases. 
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This behaviour may actually be socially beneficial, as it helps merging parties to avoid a longer delay by causing a shorter delay. For this reason it is possible that the Commission acknowledges the use of the phase I suspension of investigations as long as it leads to a simplified assessment of mergers and consequently to a better use of resources. As Portugal explained in one of its ICLG submissions: "some of the cases suggest that the Authority might be willing to suspend the phase 1 deadline for longer periods in order to close the case without initiating phase 2". Table 4 showed that nearly half of the phase II investigations were suspended under the new ECMR, as opposed to the 10% of phase I suspension cases in the same time period. A possible explanation could be that merging parties have become better at offering remedies to avoid phase II investigations, therefore only those mergers go into a second phase investigation where the parties are less delay-averse. As a consequence, these firms are more likely to show negligence in complying with ECMR measures.
The previous section also found some evidence that the timing of remedy offers and final decisions follow a log-logistic distribution in both the phase I and phase II sub-samples. The log-logistic assumption of the examined variables implies that whenever a competition authority can suspend the merger investigation for a longer period of time, the timing of procedural events (offering of a remedy, or reaching a final decision) has a large amount of uncertainty, i.e. it becomes more difficult to predict at the start of the investigation how long the procedure will last, or how long it will take before the parties offer remedies.
The log-logistic distribution provides an easy-to-interpret mathematical formula for the timing of procedural events in merger cases. The regulatory timeframe for merger procedures determines the α parameter (which is the median of the distribution). The β parameter depends on the level of diversity in the length of procedures. Suspension largely influences the total length of the analysed events; therefore smaller values of β indicate a larger variance of suspension (and investigation) length. As suspension is a function of delayaverseness, a smaller value for β implies more variance in delay-averseness as well. Therefore α should be around the regulatory set time limit, and β is expected to be smaller for phase I cases (where a larger variance in length has been showed). Table 10 contains the log-logistic parameter estimates for the phase I and phase II sub-samples of NLENGTH and NREM. As projected, the scale (α) parameters are close to the regulatory time limit set for each of the eventspells, but are larger than the regulated time limit as a result of suspended investigations. The β parameters also behave as predicted, they assume a smaller value for phase I procedures, as a result of the cases where the phase I investigation was suspended to avoid a phase II procedure.
To conclude, the possibility of indefinite-length suspension, the varying delayaverseness of merging parties and their consequent behaviour that determines the length of this suspension -makes the distribution of the timing of the examined events skewed to the right, with a high kurtosis. This may be caused by two types of behaviour.
(1) In phase I cases merging parties' strategy may be to suspend the investigation to gain some time to avoid lengthy phase II investigations, and (2) when less delay-averse companies negligently cause delays by failing to comply with the relevant merger legislation (which then jeopardises the success of their merger).
As a final exercise, another situation is analysed, which does not allow for the suspension of cases. For this reason a simulated case where -contrary to the EC -the maximum length of suspension is defined in merger laws is analysed. 73 The purpose of this exercise is to examine whether the characteristics explained above can also be found in a regime that does not allow for indefinite-length suspension of investigations.
A simulated case of merger investigations without indefinite suspension
To simulate a situation where the procedural framework does not allow for Two things clearly stand out even after a visual comparison of Figure 4 with the histograms of sub-samples with indefinite suspension (Figure 3) . Firstly, the data points are a lot more concentrated around the mean. In practice this means that the right-skewness disappears, and the mean length of the procedure is shorter than in cases with indefinite suspension. T-tests for the difference between cases with and without suspension, for both phase I and phase II cases, confirm this by showing a significant difference in the means. 77 The sample without indefinite suspension visibly has a smaller variance, which is also formally confirmed by a variance ratio test. 78 The second observation is that albeit eliminating some of the uncertainty, the two variables are still stochastic, and there is still a high ratio of data points that are beyond the regulatory time limits. This means that there is a high degree of unaccounted delay in the Commission's practice, which strengthens the stochastic nature of these variables even after the elimination of indefinite length suspensions.
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The comparison of phase I cases showed a t-value: 5.0972 and for phase II cases t = 2.6778
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The variance ratio test resulted in an f-value of 16.2080 for phase I and 6.50 for phase II cases Using the technique presented in Section 4.1.1 for measuring boundedness, the same calculations are conducted for the simulated sub-samples. The results of these calculations are presented in Table 11 . Finally, the summary statistics of the four simulated sub-samples are presented in Table 12 : The skeweness and the excess kurtosis in the simulated sub-samples are very close to zero, i.e. the heavy tails disappeared. This is a very significant difference as opposed to the results in Table 7 . Another interesting finding is that the skeweness results in Table 12 show that there is no difference in the skeweness of phase I and phase II subsamples, and the difference in kurtosis is also smaller than what was found in the previous section. This confirms that the larger (both in an absolute and a relative sense) skeweness and kurtosis figures for the phase I subsample were the result of the possibility of indefinite-length suspension in the merger regime.
Assuming that the simulated samples realistically model a situation where the law does not allow the indefinite-length suspension of investigations, one can compare Table 12 and Table 7 to see the difference between the distribution of the timing of procedural events in two different merger control regimes (one that allows for indefinite suspension, and one that does not). After eliminating the possibility of indefinite suspension, the distribution of both the timing of remedy offers and the timing of final decisions become bounded, and the skeweness and kurtosis differences between the two procedural phases also disappear. From this we can formally conclude that the elimination of the possibility of an indefinite suspension of procedures reduces the uncertainty regarding the length of procedures.
The above exercise (not allowing the indefinite suspension of investigations)
showed that delay cannot be caused by merging parties in jurisdictions that does not allow the indefinite-length suspension of investigations. However if suspension is allowed in phase I to help parties improve their chances in avoiding second phase investigations, then the elimination of indefinite-length suspension would also eliminate the beneficial effect of phase I suspensions.
Conclusion
The current merger review system provided by the ECMR gives rise to a source of procedural delay that has not been analysed empirically. Although it is the regulator, or the lengthy judicial review that is most commonly criticised for delayed mergers, merging parties can also delay the procedure, given that the investigation can be suspended where the Commission has to request information owing to circumstances for which one of the undertakings involved in the concentration is responsible. The paper showed that this leads to a highly varying length of procedural delays.
The occurrence of this sort of delay is more frequent than what would be expected from the wording of the ECMR, which reserves suspension to exceptional cases. The variance of the duration of this delay is rather large, which is due to the fact that the ECMR does not set an upper limit for the length of the suspension (the investigation is suspended until the requested information is provided). As suspension is a consequence of the merging parties' behaviour, the dispersion in the length of delay implies a large variance in the delay-averseness of the merging parties.
Two cases of delay should be distinguished. Finally, using the same technique, the histograms and kernel estimates are presented for cases where suspension was excluded from the sample. The table below contains the calculated parameters of the histograms and the kernel density estimates for these cases. 
